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Businesses Must Pay When They Let
Others Play: A Business Entity’s Duty
to Prevent the Foreseeable Criminal
Acts of Others
Colleen Giles*
INTRODUCTION

In Rhode Island, the existence of a legal duty in a negligence
action is a pure question of law. 1 Therefore, establishing a duty in
a negligence claim is essential to surviving pretrial dispositive
motions.2 The linchpin in establishing a duty is foreseeability.3 In
cases where a plaintiff, on a business’s premises, is injured by a
third party’s criminal acts, the plaintiff can establish foreseeability
by showing that similar criminal acts had occurred there before.
Without prior similar criminal acts, it can be very difficult to
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2019.
1. Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 705 (R.I. 2003).
2. See Phelps v. Hebert, 93 A.3d 942, 946 (R.I. 2014) (“If the court finds
that no duty exists, ‘the trier of fact has nothing to consider and a motion for
summary judgment must be granted.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1252 (R.I. 2012) (“It is not until a legal duty
is established that a plaintiff is entitled to a factual determination on the
enduring elements of his or her negligence claim . . . .”); Benaski v.
Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 502 (R.I. 2006) (“A fundamental principle of tort law,
and a dispositive one based on the circumstances of this case, is that ‘[a]
defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant
owes a duty to the plaintiff.’” (quoting Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864
A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005))). But see Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1055–56
(R.I. 1998) (“[I]t is still the function of the jury to determine the existence of
those predicate facts that trigger the presence of the legal duty.”).
3. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2018); Volpe,
A.2d at 705.
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establish foreseeability. As a general rule, a landowner does not
have a duty to control criminal acts of third parties. 4 Consequently,
plaintiffs alleging that a business has a duty to prevent criminal
acts of third parties—without evidence of prior similar criminal
acts—are often unable to prevail on pretrial dispositive motions and
get their case before a jury. In Mu v. Omni Hotels Management
Corp., the First Circuit created a new avenue for plaintiffs to assert
that a hotel has a duty to prevent foreseeable harm caused by the
criminal acts of others.5
As a matter of first impression under Rhode Island law, the
First Circuit, in its “Erie guess,” held that a hotel had a legal duty
to an invitee because the sequence of events leading to the invitee’s
injury made the harm foreseeable. 6 The “sequence of events”
theory is a new method for plaintiffs to establish foreseeability in
Rhode Island, thus triggering a business entity’s legal duty to
prevent harm.
Foreseeability is often the most difficult theory to prove in
determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff. 7
Foreseeability is defined differently in each jurisdiction, but is
typically an amalgam of:
[T]he multitude of factors, knowledge, hunches, instincts
or what they may be called, the common sense that makes
social intercourse possible, all operate to prompt the
“ordinary reasonable man” that harms are “probable” or
“natural” as normal results of certain situations and
certain conduct. Where harm is to be anticipated, the
problem of legal responsibility is raised.8

4. Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., 969 A.2d 653, 658 (R.I. 2009);
Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 686 (R.I. 1994).
5. See 882 F.3d at 13.
6. Id. at 3. In interpreting state law, federal courts must first consider
any decisions of the state’s highest court. When there is no state case law
directly on point, the federal court must predict what a state’s highest court
would decide if it were to address the issue itself. This is called an “Erie guess.”
See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state”).
7. E. L. Kellett, Private Person’s Duty and Liability for Failure to Protect
Another Against Criminal Attack by Third Person, 10 A.L.R.3d 619, § 11 (“One
of the most difficult considerations in cases dealing with the subject covered in
this note is the problem of foreseeability.”).
8. Fowler Vincent Harper, The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Tort, 7
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Despite this seemingly inclusive definition, foreseeability can only
be established in a negligence action in a limited number of ways.9
The recognition of a sequence of events theory to prove
foreseeability eliminates a dangerous loophole under previous
Rhode Island case law that allowed landowners to easily argue a
lack of foreseeability when there had been no prior criminal
activity. Whether harm resulting from a third party’s criminal act
was foreseeable has rested heavily upon the existence of prior
criminal acts. Accordingly, absent skilled lawyering, business
entity defendants were almost always relieved from liability for the
first plaintiff’s injury as a result of their breach of duty to prevent
criminal acts of others. 10 This means that two identical plaintiffs
who were harmed on the premises of the same business by two
identical acts of the same third party, but at separate times, could
obtain two different results for their negligence claims under Rhode
Island law. The first injured plaintiff would be unable to establish
foreseeability, while the second injured plaintiff would be able to
show the existence of prior similar criminal acts to establish
foreseeability. The second plaintiff would be able to put forth
evidence that triggered a legal duty. The first plaintiff injured is in
essence a sacrificial lamb, creating an evidentiary foundation for
future injured parties to assert foreseeability through prior similar
criminal activity. 11
Part I of this Comment will explain the background and
evolution of Rhode Island law on establishing foreseeability and a
legal duty. Part II will explain the holding in Mu and the
implications of the adoption of a sequence of events theory. Finally,
Part III will argue that while the court in Mu held that the sequence
of events that occurred established foreseeability, and thus a duty
on a hotel corporation, the holding in Mu has broader applicability
to business entities beyond hotels and innkeepers.
I.

RHODE ISLAND LAW ON ESTABLISHING FORESEEABILITY AND A

NOTRE DAME L. REV. 468, 468 (1932).
9. See id.
10. See generally Mu, 882 F.3d at 1.
11. See Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 47, 51 (1st Cir.
1997) (finding it was not foreseeable that plaintiff would be attacked by a
mongoose on defendant hotel’s property when no other patrons had ever been
bitten before on the property).
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DUTY

“Rhode Island has not squarely addressed whether a business
owner has a duty to protect its patrons from third-party criminal
activity occurring on its premises.” 12 Ordinarily in Rhode Island,
no legal duty exists “to control a third party’s conduct to prevent
harm to another individual.” 13 However, the courts carved out an
exception to this rule. A defendant can have a legal duty to a
plaintiff if the defendant has a “special relationship” with either the
plaintiff or the third party whose conduct led to the harm.14
A. The Role of a Special Relationship in Conferring a Duty on
Defendants
A “special relationship” flows from a defendant’s status as a
property owner. 15 Examples of special relationships include: a
common carrier and its passengers; an innkeeper and its guests; a
possessor of land held open to the public and members of the public;
and a legal or voluntary custodian and its ward.16 As the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides, “[a] special relationship . .
. may arise between the possessor of land and those allowed on the
land because of the possessor’s power of control over those allowed
to enter.” 17
Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has explained, a
“possessor of land that holds the land open to the public/member of
the public” is one type of special relationship that “giv[es] rise to a
duty to aid or protect.” 18 Given that holding land open to members

12. 1 JOHN ELLIOTT LEIGHTON, LITIGATING PREMISES SECURITY CASES § 2:4
(Nov. 2018).
13. Santana, 969 A.2d at 658.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to
prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a
special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection.
Id.
15. See Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 915 (R.I. 2005); Volpe v.
Gallagher, 821 A.2d 706 (R.I. 2003).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
17. See Volpe, 821 A.2d at 706 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 392 (5th ed.1984)).
18. Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1258 (R.I. 2012).
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of the public is typically sufficient grounds for a special
relationship, most businesses likely satisfy the requirements of a
special relationship. 19 As such, most businesses have a duty to aid
and/or protect in Rhode Island. 20
B. Ad Hoc Approach to Finding a Duty
In addition to a special relationship, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has identified five other factors relevant to finding a duty. 21
While it is unclear if the existence of a special relationship is a
precondition to examining the five factors, some courts have treated
the finding of a special relationship as a precondition.22 Other
courts have analyzed the five factors and stated that the
relationship between the parties “is likewise considered” in its duty
analysis.23
Under Rhode Island case law, there is no “set formula for
finding [a] legal duty,” and thus “such a determination must be
made on a case-by-case basis.” 24 The court employs an “ad hoc
approach” to determining whether a particular duty exists.25 The
five Banks factors considered in the ad hoc approach are:
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (3) the
closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered, (4) the policy of preventing future
harm, and (5) the extent of the burden to the defendant
and the consequences to the community for imposing a
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.26
Among the ad hoc factors relevant to this analysis,
foreseeability is the “linchpin in determining the existence of any
duty.” 27 As the linchpin, it can be inferred that foreseeability is
intentionally identified as the first factor analyzed. Without
19. Habershaw v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 42 A.3d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 2012)
(citing Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 716 (R.I. 1999)).
20. See Gushlaw, 42 A.3d at 1257.
21. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2018).
22. Id. at 6 n.3.
23. Id.; Selwyn v. Ward, 879 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2005).
24. Flynn v. Nickerson Cmty. Ctr., 177 A.3d 468, 477 (R.I. 2018) (citing
Wells v. Smith, 102 A.3d 650, 653 (R.I. 2014)).
25. Mu, 882 F.3d at 6.
26. Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987).
27. Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 466 (R.I. 1996).
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foreseeability, it is extremely difficult, even if the other factors were
in their favor, for a plaintiff to establish the defendant had a duty
to protect the plaintiff from harm caused by third parties in Rhode
Island. Not surprisingly, the issue of foreseeability is one of the
most heavily litigated issues in negligence law. Additionally,
foreseeability is discussed more than any of the other five factors in
most of the opinions issued by Rhode Island courts.
In Rhode Island, “‘the specific kind of harm need not be
foreseeable as long as it was foreseeable that there would be harm
from the act which constituted the negligence, provided it was
foreseeable that there would be violence toward others.’” 28 An
inquiry into a harm’s foreseeability considers whether “‘the
category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result
in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be
imposed on the negligent party.’” 29 For example, in Santana v.
Rainbow Cleaners, the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered
only whether the injury to a third party was foreseeable by the
defendant’s failure to commit a third party to a mental hospital, not
the specific assault suffered by the plaintiff. 30 Similarly, in
Gushlaw v. Milner, the court considered whether a driver, by
returning an intoxicated individual to his or her vehicle, would
reasonably perceive the risk of injury to other drivers. 31 The court
did not explore the specific harm to the plaintiff.32
C. Foreseeability Without Evidence of Past Similar Occurrences
Though plaintiffs only have to establish that harm was
foreseeable, rather than the specific type of harm that occurred,
plaintiffs still face challenges in establishing foreseeability in
negligence actions. Defendants often argue that the lack of prior
similar criminal acts renders a plaintiff’s injury unforeseeable.33
Historically, the inability to produce evidence of past similar
criminal activity has served as the death knell to a plaintiff’s

28. Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 917 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Pollard v.
Powers, 738 N.E.2d 1144, 1146 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)).
29. Id. (quoting Banks, 522 A.2d at 1226–27).
30. 969 A.2d 653, 664 (R.I. 2009).
31. 42 A.3d 1245, 1261 (R.I. 2012).
32. Id.
33. See Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2018); see
also Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 716 (R.I. 2003).
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foreseeability argument. 34 This is illustrated in Thanadabouth v.
Kongmany, in which tenants were injured when a robber shot the
plaintiffs and they sued the landlord for failure to maintain
adequate security measures. 35 The Rhode Island Supreme Court,
in deciding this case, held that a landlord owed no duty to a tenant
to prevent crimes by third persons when there was no evidence of
criminal activity on the premises prior to the robbery and shooting
at issue.36 The lack of prior criminal acts rendered the plaintiffs’
harm unforeseeable and prevented any legal duty from being
created. 37
D. The Intersection of Foreseeability and Public Policy in the
Analysis of a Duty
Even when there is evidence of prior similar criminal activity,
it may be insufficient to establish foreseeability. 38 In certain
circumstances, courts have found that important policy
considerations warrant a deviation from past precedent. 39 In Flynn
v. Nickerson Community Center, the plaintiffs brought a negligence
action against the Nickerson Community Center after a juvenile
stole a van from the defendant’s premises and, while attempting to
evade police, collided with the plaintiffs’ vehicle and caused serious
injury. 40 Even though the plaintiffs were able to put forth evidence
that, on at least one occasion, a vehicle owned by another individual
was stolen from the defendant’s premises, the court declined to
recognize a duty. 41
In addition to the specific incident of past crime at Nickerson,
the plaintiffs argued that, because the Nickerson Community
Center is located in a high-crime area, the theft of a vehicle and
subsequent accident was foreseeable harm. 42 Notwithstanding the
prior vehicle theft, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the
location of a defendant’s property in a high-crime area was not a
34. See Thanadabouth v. Kongmany, 712 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1998); see also
Volpe, 821 A.2d at 699.
35. Thanadabouth, 712 A.2d at 879.
36. Id. at 880.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Flynn v. Nickerson Cmty. Ctr., 177 A.3d 468 (R.I. 2018).
39. See generally id.
40. Id. at 471.
41. Id. at 472 n.3.
42. Id. at 480.
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relevant factor in establishing foreseeability. 43 The court reasoned
that there were important policy considerations against allowing
proximity to a crime-ridden area to be a factor in a duty analysis. 44
Thus, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Nickerson’s
location in a high-crime area was a basis for foreseeability.45
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has also been persuaded by
policy considerations to benefit a plaintiff. In Volpe v. Gallagher,
the court rejected what it described as the “who knew” defense
asserted by the defendants. 46 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
found that the defendants did owe a legal duty of care despite the
absence of past violent behavior. 47 The policy considerations were
so strong that they motivated the court to depart from the prior
similar occurrences theory. 48
In Volpe, a private landowner’s adult son lived in her basement
for the entirety of his life. 49 Even though he suffered from severe
mental illness, his mother, the defendant, allowed him to store
firearms and ammunition in her basement. 50 One afternoon, the
defendant’s son emerged from the basement and shot and killed his
next-door neighbor.51 The son had never used his firearms before
this incident. 52 Making this holding even more remarkable is that
it was unclear if the defendant’s son shot his neighbor on the
defendant’s premises or the victim’s premises. 53
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated, “we hold[] the
absence of a violent past did not excuse defendant’s conduct in
failing to exercise control over her property to prevent such a
mentally ill person from using her house as an ordnance depot.”54
Like Flynn, the court in Volpe stated that important policy
considerations can impact the role of prior similar criminal activity
43. Id.
44. Id. at 481. The court stated that this could “have the undesired
consequence of ‘the departure of businesses from urban core areas’” or if
businesses remain, additional security measures could mean higher prices for
the goods and services that customers need. Id. (internal citation omitted).
45. Id. at 480.
46. 821 A.2d 699, 710 (R.I. 2003).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 702.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 703.
52. Id. at 710
53. Id. at 703.
54. Id. at 710.
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when establishing foreseeability.55 The Volpe court reasoned that:
a property owner allows a person who she knows is
suffering from a delusionary and paranoid mental illness
to use her property for the storage and maintenance of
firearms and ammunition—despite realizing that this
person has a history of talking to himself and to imaginary
others; of harboring paranoid suspicions about other
people; of not taking medication for his mental problems;
and of not improving after receiving medical treatment for
his mental illness—then that property owner is taking a
foreseeable risk that a third party in close proximity of that
dangerous activity will be hurt or killed.56
The court was not willing to sacrifice the duty owed to the plaintiff
even though there was no evidence of past similar occurrences. 57
II. MU V. OMNI HOTEL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

With the previously stated evolution of foreseeability law in
mind, the First Circuit, applying Rhode Island law, held for the first
time that the sequence of events leading to an invitee’s injury made
the plaintiff’s harm foreseeable and, therefore, conferred a legal
duty on the defendant-hotel.58 The sequence of events theory
provides plaintiffs with an additional method for establishing
foreseeability. Plaintiffs who are unable to establish foreseeability
through prior similar criminal activity can still prevail under the
sequence of events theory without having to argue for the
application of the narrow public policy exception to impose a duty
on the defendant.59
A. Facts
In Mu v. Omni Hotels Management Corp., the plaintiff, Mr. Mu,
lived in a condominium complex located on the premises of the
defendant-hotel. 60 At 2:10 a.m. on a summer evening, the hotel
received a complaint that “kids [were] smoking pot in the next
55. See generally id. at 699; Flynn v. Nickerson Cmty. Ctr., 177 A.3d 468,
480 (R.I. 2018).
56. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 710.
57. Id. at 716.
58. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2018).
59. See Volpe, 821 A.2d at 721.
60. Mu, 882 F.3d at 3.
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room” and being “very loud.” 61 The hotel sent two hotel security
guards to the room.62 When they arrived, the security guards found
twenty individuals inside the room and the registered hotel guest
was not among them. 63 The security guards evicted the occupants
and removed them from the hotel’s premises.64
At this time, the hotel’s valet observed the same group of
individuals leave the lobby and walk down the street. 65 Shortly
thereafter, the group reemerged near the hotel’s driveway with a
case of beer. 66 The valet observed the group “being rowdy” and
engage in a fight on the sidewalk near the hotel. 67 The valet did
not request hotel security or call the police.68 After the fight ended,
Mu came down to the hotel driveway to greet his girlfriend. 69
There, Mu observed the group coming in and out the hotel’s lobby. 70
Mu then saw the group trying to engage in a fight with a man. After
the man walked away from the hotel, the group continued to pursue
him.71 Mu instructed the valet to go get help, as he feared the group
was violent. 72 The valet responded that it was not his problem,
and then left to park a car. 73
Scared for his own safety, Mu headed for the lobby. 74 As soon
as Mu entered the lobby, he warned the hotel concierge that the
group was outside. 75 The group then stormed in and Mu could hear
them celebrating that they “just beat up some kid.” 76 Mu requested
that the concierge remove the group from the property and call the
police.77 In response, the group of individuals began to punch,
shove, and hit Mu.78 The assault culminated when two members

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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of the group held Mu down while a third member of the group threw
a table at him.79
Mu later filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against the hotel.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
concluded that the defendant did not have a duty to protect the
plaintiff and dismissed the action.80 The District Court reasoned
that Mu presented no evidence the third parties committed prior
similar criminal activity towards the plaintiff before the attack or
prior criminal activity at the hotel generally. 81 Mu appealed the
decision to First Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. Special Relationship and Foreseeability Based on Sequence of
Events Theory
The parties in Mu conceded that the hotel and the plaintiff had
a special relationship because the defendant-hotel was a “possessor
of land that holds the land open to the public/member of the public,”
and the plaintiff was a member of the public.82 Therefore, the
relationship between Mu and the defendant-hotel lent support to
Mu’s argument that a duty existed. Next, the court analyzed the
element of foreseeability, and turned to the first and most
persuasive of the Banks factors to determine if a duty
existed.83 The plaintiff did not produce any evidence of prior
criminal activity on the hotel’s premises.84 As such, defendanthotel argued that the harm was not foreseeable and, therefore, the
hotel had no duty.85 The First Circuit rejected this argument.86
The court accepted Mu’s argument that his harm was
foreseeable because “‘at least four of Omni’s agents were aware of
the group’s violent and illegal conduct during the thirty-five minute
period before the attack.’” 87 The First Circuit, persuaded by case
law from other jurisdictions that have adopted a sequence of events
theory, believed that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would rule
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
1987).
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 6; Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I.
Mu, 882 F.3d at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the same way. 88 The court explained that it was foreseeable that
the plaintiff would be harmed as a result of the group’s criminal
acts because the group was evicted by security for causing a
disturbance; subsequently obtained beer; fought with each other;
attacked a passerby; and were permitted to reenter the hotel
lobby.89 The First Circuit stated that its decision was “compatible
with Rhode Island law,” and recognized that Omni owed the
plaintiff a duty. 90
III. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THEORY VERSUS THE PAST
OCCURRENCES THEORY AND A HOTEL’S DUTY UNDER MU

The sequence of events theory adopted by the court in Mu
allows a plaintiff to establish that harm is foreseeable when the
particular sequence of events leading up to the harm made the
harm foreseeable to the defendant. 91 The standard to establish
foreseeability under a sequence of events theory seems to be
objective, and does not require a plaintiff to prove his or her specific
defendant foresaw harm. 92 Rather, the Mu court explained harm
is foreseeable if “[a]n observer of this sequence of events would not
be shocked to discover” the harm the plaintiff suffered.93 As long
as the four other ad hoc factors do not hedge against the finding of
a duty, and the sequence of events is compelling, the plaintiff will
likely be able to establish that the defendant owed a duty of care to
prevent harm from the criminal acts of third parties.94
The plaintiff in Mu conceded his case would have failed under
a “past occurrences” theory, but urged the court to recognize a
sequence of events theory. 95 The hotel argued that Rhode Island
should follow a past occurrences approach when establishing
foreseeability.96 Under a past occurrences approach, there is no
bright line rule as to how many, or what type of, past similar
88. Id. at 7–8 (relying on Cotterhill v. Bafile, 865, P.2d 120, 122 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993); Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511, 513–14 (Kan. 1986); Mills v.
White Castle Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 631, 632 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
89. Mu, 882 F.3d at 9.
90. Id. at 10.
91. See id. at 9–10.
92. See id. at 10.
93. Id.
94. See id. (citing Cotterhill, 865 P.2d at 122; Gould, 722 P.2d at 513–14;
Mills, 421 N.W.2d at 632).
95. Id. at 9.
96. Id.

2019]

FORESEEABILITY

371

incidents is sufficient to establish foreseeability.97 In jurisdictions
that reject an ad hoc approach to finding that harm was foreseeable,
as many as five prior incidents of assault were needed to
sufficiently state a cause of action for third-party premises liability
where the event that injured the plaintiff was assault. 98
Under the sequence of events approach adopted in Mu, which
looks more to the totality of the circumstances, evidence of past
similar incidents can be used as a supplementary factor to be
included in a foreseeability analysis. 99 But as evidenced in Mu, a
successful assertion of the sequence of events theory eliminates the
need for past similar incidents to establish foreseeability. 100 The
Mu holding expands the tools available to plaintiffs who suffer
injuries through the criminal acts of third parties, and bolsters
their likely success in a negligence action with compelling facts. 101
In Rhode Island, hotels and innkeepers must now be sensitive
to hints and indications of violent behavior committed by third
parties on their premises. 102 Hotels—like the Omni—in cases
where harm is foreseeable, under the sequence of events theory,
will have a duty to act reasonably to protect everyone on the
premises from the criminal acts of third parties. 103
Hotels may exercise reasonable care by maintaining adequate
security measures, such as a security guard or video
surveillance. 104 Hotels may be required to implement low-cost
tactics, including restraining guests in the event that danger is

97. 26 ERIC G. YOUNG, CAUSES OF ACTION 2d § 57 (2004, updated Oct. 2014).
Practice guides advise attorneys that
it seems unlikely that even the most conservative jurisdictions would
find that a large number of prior incidents of murder or rape, for
example, would be required before holding a business owner or
proprietor liable for such crimes on its premises. However, the
severity of the crime often results in less foreseeability on the part of
the landholder.
Id. (citing Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1987)).
98. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 40 (N.C. 1981).
99. See Mu, 882 F.3d at 6–7.
100. See id. at 9–10.
101. See id. at 9.
102. See id. at 10.
103. See id.
104. Doug Donaldson, 12 Ways to Increase Hotel Security, LODGING MAG.
(Nov. 12, 2013), https://lodgingmagazine.com/ways-to-increase-hotel-security/
2/ [https://perma.cc/4AG5-2VXE].
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foreseeable and calling the police.105 Factors to consider when
determining the adequacy of security measures include industry
standards, community crime rate, crime rate of similar business
enterprises, the extent of criminal activity in the area, and the
security concerns unique to that particular hotel.106
A. The Site of the Negligence or the Site of the Injury
Before Mu, Rhode Island courts had not squarely addressed
whether a business owner or proprietor owes a duty to its patrons
to protect against third-party criminal activity occurring on its
premises. As such, many defendants have relied upon the holding
in Ferreira v. Strack. 107 In Ferreira, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that a landholder did not owe the plaintiff a duty to
protect against criminal acts committed by third parties
on adjacent property. 108 There, the plaintiff sued a church after
she was struck by a car driven by an intoxicated driver as she was
crossing a busy street following church services. 109 The court
focused extensively on the fact that the injury occurred in an area
outside of the church’s control, so Ferreira provides little guidance
in assessing a landholder’s duty to protect patrons on its own
premises. 110
Clearly, the holding in Ferreira is limited to the site or location
of the injury. 111 The holding in Mu suggests that the time may be
ripe for an argument to expand the limited holding in Ferreira, as
Mu appears to look to the location of the negligence rather than the
location of the injury. 112 While the issue in Mu was limited to
foreseeability and the existence of a legal duty, the expansive
nature of the sequence of events approach has the power to shift the
negligence analysis from a general premises liability action that is
restricted to injuries occurring on the landowner’s property, to an
action in negligence for a failure to prevent off-premises injury.113
105. 1 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY &
LITIGATION 2d § 3:50 (2003).
106. Id. (citing Ellis v. Luxbury Hotels, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. 1999)).
107. 636 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1994).
108. Id. at 689.
109. Id. at 684.
110. Id. at 686–87.
111. Id.
112. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 7–8, 25 (1st Cir. 2018).
113. See Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 685 (stating that landowners are not liable
for injuries caused by the criminal acts of third parties on adjacent property
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Frequently, the sequence of events that led to the foreseeability
of injury also reveals the defendant’s negligence. For example, the
sequence of events that led to the foreseeability of Mu’s injuries
could also be illustrative of Omni’s inadequate security, poor staff
training to handle incidents like rowdy guests and intruders, and
lack of security protocol. 114 The failure of Omni’s agent, the valet
driver, to alert hotel security or the police indicates that guest
safety was not a priority.115 Further, the hotel’s security cameras
were not functioning, which rendered the security office unable to
surveil the entrance and take preventative measures—such as
sending personnel to protect hotel occupants, like Mu, when the
third-party assailants returned.116 Even if Mu had been injured on
property adjacent to the hotel, Mu could point to these failures in
the standard of care, and possibly succeed under a non-premises
negligence theory (provided he was able to establish the other
elements required in a negligence action.) 117
Other jurisdictions have found a duty when the injury occurred
off-premises. Weighing the sequence of events (referred to in
Colorado as the “totality of the circumstances”), the Colorado
Supreme Court found that a hotel owed a duty beyond its property
line when the hotel evicted intoxicated guests and forced them to
leave its property, and one of the guests was then injured in a drunk
driving accident. 118 The hotel did not allow the guests to wait in
the lobby for a cab and, despite knowledge of the group’s
intoxication, sent the individuals away in their vehicle. 119 Fifteen
miles from the hotel, the intoxicated guests collided with another
car. 120 The court found that the injury was foreseeable under the
sequence of events theory and, therefore, the hotel owed a duty to
under a premises liability theory); see also Mu, 882 F.3d at 7, 10.
114. See generally Mu, 882 F.3d 1.
115. See id. at 4.
116. Id. at 4–5.
117. See Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 704 (R.I. 2003) (finding a duty
existed even though it was not clear if the injury occurred on the defendant’s
property or adjacent property not owned or maintained by the defendant); see
also United States v. Stevens, 994 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2008) (finding a scientific
laboratory owed a legal duty to the general public to prevent third parties from
stealing hazardous substances).
118. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 347 P.3d 606, 608 (Colo. 2015). It is
important to note that this is not a dram shop case. The defendant did not
supply or sell alcohol to any of the guests.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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the intoxicated guests. 121 The court noted several alternatives that
would have been more reasonable instead of evicting the guests and
forcing them to their car, such as calling the police for assistance or
calling a cab. 122
Hotels and innkeepers in jurisdictions like Colorado and Rhode
Island can no longer assume that a lack of prior similar incidents
will shield them from liability when injury is foreseeable. 123 Hotels
and innkeepers should also be aware that, as case law evolves
around the country, they may be required to not only take steps to
prevent injury on the premises, but also to prevent injury beyond
the confines of their property. 124
B. Current Events and a Sequence of Events Leading to
Foreseeability
Current events, such as the shooting at the Harvest Music
Festival in Las Vegas, the Parkland School in Florida, and the
shooting that occurred at YouTube’s headquarters in California,
reveal that threats to personal safety are progressing. 125 A Federal
Bureau of Investigation study found that nearly half of the 160
active-shooting incidents that occurred in the past decade took
place in commercial settings.126 When a person or group of
individuals shows signs of excessive substance abuse or symptoms
of mental illness that demonstrate a propensity for violence, like
those that perpetrated many of the mass shootings, those charged
with securing the safety of the premises must be on alert.
Innkeepers, and other business entities that have a “special
relationship” with those on their premises, are in the best position
121. Id. at 616.
122. Id. at 614.
123. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2018).
124. Westin, 347 P.3d at 615–16.
125. See Enjoli Francis, Security Failures in Parkland School Shooting
Included Unlocked Doors, No PA System, ABC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2018, 5:01 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/security-failures-parkland-school-shootingincluded-unlocked-doors/story?id=60056864 [https://perma.cc/3H2Z-R9ED];
see also Tiffany Hsu & Jack Nicas, Youtube Shooting Puts a Focus on
Workplace Security, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
04/05/technology/corporate-security-active-shooter-youtube.html
[https://perma.cc/8PXF-JM9B]; Rhana Natour, Are Hotels and Outdoor
Concerts Any Safer Since the Las Vegas Attack?, PBS (May 7, 2018, 4:49 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/are-hotels-and-outdoor-concerts-anysafer-since-the-las-vegas-attack [https://perma.cc/35QN-FYCW].
126. See infra section I.A.
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to be alert and proactive about maintaining safety and security for
guests. 127 Encouraging businesses to disrupt threats of violence
and implement proper security training and protocol to combat
these threats is in the best interest of the business entity and every
individual that enters the premises. This is particularly true in the
age of increased violence and mass shootings.128
In addition to putting forth general knowledge about the
correlation between intoxication, mental illness, and violence
through expert testimony and scientific journals that have
documented the connection, plaintiffs can also elicit experiential
observations by hospitality staff members in the vicinity about the
link between substance abuse and violence. 129 Plaintiffs looking to
focus on the foreseeability of the specific type of harm suffered may
look to evidence showing the rate of violent incidences among
intoxicated drinkers, the types of intoxicated drinkers who become
violent, or the class of persons at risk of violent harm from a visibly
intoxicated person. 130 Similar data may be utilized to show the
correlation between mental illness and violence.
Recognizing foreseeability through the use of a sequence of
events will incentivize businesses to employ best safety practices
(in an effort to avoid litigation) that, in turn, keep the community
safer. With mental health awareness on the rise, access to
information regarding how to identify symptoms of substance abuse
and mental illness, and how to respond to those symptoms, is easier
than ever to obtain.131 This is important because mental illness
and substance abuse are two potential indicators of violence. 132 As
with the young and rowdy crowd in Mu, many of the perpetrators
of crime, who become the subject of personal injury cases, show
signs of aggression or indications that they will cause violence

127. See infra section I.A.
128. See, e.g., Press Release, ASIS Int’l and Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt.,
ASIS International and SHRM Release American National Standard on
Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention (Oct. 20, 2011),
https://www.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story?articleid=1e68ec70-ef1e4fbe-a092-f1750a61643f [https://perma.cc/MFH6-7W3H].
129. See Piazza v. Kellim, 377 P.3d 492, 503 (Or. 2016).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Mental Health First Aid, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR BEHAV. HEALTH,
https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/about/mental-health-first-aid/
[https://perma.cc/A23S-5ZYY] (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
132. Id.
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before they commit any acts of violence.133 Business entities—
especially hotels—should be ready to fulfill their duty to act
reasonably to protect guests from the criminal acts of third parties
when behavioral patterns indicate a propensity for crime or
violence.
In many cases, the burden on a hotel will be little more than
common-sense preventative measures, such as calling local
police.134 A study comparing averted acts of violence to those that
actually occurred highlighted that simple measures, such as
reporting threats of violence as soon as they appear and
implementing employee safety training, were differentiators in
averting violence. 135 Requiring businesses to develop a more keen
and attentive sensitivity to events as they unfold should mitigate
injuries committed by third parties and would keep negligence law
contemporary with the ever-evolving world.
C. Hotels, Innkeepers, and Beyond
Though not yet formally adopted by the state courts in Rhode
Island, the Mu case, combined with case law from other states, will
arguably have broad applicability on all business-entity
defendants. 136 The holding in Mu was specific to a hotel defendant,
but a majority of businesses invite members of the public onto their
premises and will now likely have a duty to prevent invitees from
the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties in Rhode Island.137
Courts in other states have adopted a sequence of events theory
to establish foreseeability that a third party would commit crime on
a business entity’s property. 138 The foreseeability of a third party’s
133. See generally Doe v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 445 A.2d 40 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1982); Jeanne Sahadi, How Common Is Workplace Violence?,
CNN MONEY, https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/26/news/workplace-violencevirginia-shooting [https://perma.cc/U64L-VGEY] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
134. See Shayna Balch, Workplace Violence: 5 Ways to Keep Your Employees
BUS.
J.,
https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/blog/
Safe,
PHX.
business/2015/01/workplace-violence-5-steps-to-keep-your-employees.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
135. Dean Esserman, The School Shootings that Don’t Happen, NAT’L
POLICE FOUND., https://www.policefoundation.org/the-school-shootings-thatdont-happen/ [https://perma.cc/Y6K8-WJ32] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
136. See generally Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2018).
137. See generally id.
138. See Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1986); Cotterhill v. Bafile,
865 P.2d 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Mills v. White Castle Sys. Inc., 421 N.W.2d
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crime(s) against another has led to the finding of a duty for
restaurants and tavern owners.139 In these cases, the third parties
responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries exhibited signs of violence and
the business-entity defendant’s agents neglected to partake in
simple and reasonable action to protect patrons.140
1.

Innkeepers, Tavern Owners, and Restaurants
State courts in Kansas have long recognized that
“A proprietor of an inn, hotel, restaurant, or similar
establishment is liable for an assault upon a guest or
patron by another guest, patron, or third person where he
has reason to anticipate such assault, and fails to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent the
assault or interfere with its execution.” 141

In Gould v. Taco Bell, the plaintiff was verbally assaulted by
another patron of the restaurant as the manager watched. 142 The
patron then physically attacked the plaintiff inside the restaurant,
and again in the parking lot. 143 The manager failed to respond to
pleas to call the police while the plaintiff was inside the restaurant,
and only contacted police after the violence spilled into the parking
lot. 144 The Supreme Court of Kansas found the sequence of conduct
by the patron, observed by the manager, made the plaintiff’s harm
foreseeable. 145 The plaintiff was awarded punitive damages in an
effort to “to punish the [restaurant] for malicious, vindictive or
willful and wanton invasion of the injured party’s rights” by failing
to intervene or warn the plaintiff of the danger posed by the third
party.146
Tavern owners have also been found liable for the foreseeable

631 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
139. See Gould, 722 P.2d at 511; Cotterhill, 865 P.2d at 120; Mills, 421
N.W.2d at 631.
140. See Gould, 722 P.2d at 511; Cotterhill, 865 P.2d at 120; Mills, 421
N.W.2d at 631.
141. Kimple v. Foster, 469 P.2d 281, 283 (Kan. 1970) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
142. Gould, 722 P.2d at 514.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 518.
146. Id. at 517.
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criminal acts of third parties.147 In Cotterhill v. Bafile, the Arizona
Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant and ordered
a new trial to determine the defendant’s liability for an assault that
occurred at the bar he owned.148 The court emphasized that “bad
feelings” between the plaintiff and the third parties “persisted for
10 to 15 minutes, including loud and hostile verbal exchanges
among several men,” and despite this, the bartender “did not
attempt to calm the situation, ask anyone to leave, threaten to call
the police[,] or call the police during that time.” 149 The court found
that the sequence of events, that albeit unfolded over only ten to
fifteen minutes, could lead a reasonable jury to find the fight was
foreseeable and therefore convey a duty upon the tavern owner.150
2.

Other Entities

While restaurants and taverns may logically go with hotels and
innkeepers, courts have also recognized a sequence of events theory
to establish the foreseeability of criminal acts to create a duty
between a school district and the victim of a criminal act committed
by a student of the district. 151 In N.L. v. Bethel School District, a
high school student of the school district raped another student of
the school when the student convinced the victim to skip track
practice under the guise of getting lunch.152 The student who raped
the younger victim was a convicted sex offender, and the school’s
principal had been informed of the student’s status. 153 In addition
to being a registered sex offender, the student had been a source on
ongoing disruptions and had committed various serious
disciplinary infractions at the school leading up to the rape.154
Despite these alarming facts, the principal failed to notify other
school employees of the student’s status as a registered sex offender
or implement a safety plan to protect other students. 155
Furthermore, the student was permitted to act as a student-mentor

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See generally Cotterhill v. Bafile, 865 P.2d 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 122.
N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 378 P.3d 162, 164 (Wash. 2016).
Id. at 164.
Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
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for younger students on the track team. 156 The court found that
the sequence of events leading up to the victim’s rape made her
harm foreseeable and the inaction of the school district, the
principal, and other agents of the district amounted to a breach of
the duty of care owed to the victim. 157
The recognition of a sequence of events to establish
foreseeability can have impact on all defendants found to have a
special relationship with a defendant, even those that are less
obvious such as schools.
CONCLUSION

The recognition of a sequence of events theory to establish the
foreseeability of a plaintiff’s harm is a necessary expansion of
current negligence law in Rhode Island because it permits a court
to consider the totality of the circumstances when contemplating
foreseeability, and eliminates the ability of a culpable defendant to
evade liability when the plaintiff is unable to produce evidence of
prior criminal acts or strong policy considerations. Further, it
raises the bar for businesses to be aware of, and reactive towards,
threats of criminal activity on their property. While the holding in
Mu was narrow and addressed only the duty owed by a hotel, the
reasoning applied by the First Circuit has the potential for broad
applicability encompassing all business (and quasi-business)
entity-defendants that invite members of the public onto their
property.

156.
157.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 170.

